Context
The ed-tech company's builder can publish apps to the app stores. I owned a hardening pass on that pipeline in 2026, after a fleet security audit.
The problem
The build trigger was an unauthenticated URL. Anyone who found it could start a build that pushed to Google Play production for any school with a key stored in cloud storage.
What I did
I made the trigger authenticated-only, and the control plane now calls it with a Google ID token.
I required publish builds to name an explicit release ref, and logged the exact source commit.
I made publish builds fail rather than sign with a debug key.
I moved the error-tracking token into a secret manager and replaced stored cloud credentials in the iOS pipeline with keyless federation.
I fixed a callback that used a stored credential, so callbacks now use the build's own identity token.
Key decision
I chose to make builds fail loudly instead of continuing in a weaker mode, for example a missing release signature.
The cost is that some builds now stop that used to pass. I accepted that, since a passing build with a debug key is worse.
Result
There are 0 open paths to production app-store publishing without authentication.
What I learned
I would run this kind of security review earlier, before a pipeline has been in use for long. Several of these gaps were easy to close once someone looked.
Stack
- Cloud Functions
- IAM
- Secret Manager
- Workload Identity Federation
- Node.js
- Google Play
