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Keshav Raj
An open side door to an app-store building being welded shut along a locked delivery pipeline.
SECURITY QUARTER0 OPEN PATHS
SHIPPED Closed an unauthenticated path to production app-store publishing.I OWNED OwnerOUTCOME 0 OPEN PATHS

Fleet supply-chain hardening

Keshav RajOwner · 2026 · ShippedContact meResume PDF

Context

The ed-tech company's builder can publish apps to the app stores. I owned a hardening pass on that pipeline in 2026, after a fleet security audit.

The problem

The build trigger was an unauthenticated URL. Anyone who found it could start a build that pushed to Google Play production for any school with a key stored in cloud storage.

What I did

  1. I made the trigger authenticated-only, and the control plane now calls it with a Google ID token.

  2. I required publish builds to name an explicit release ref, and logged the exact source commit.

  3. I made publish builds fail rather than sign with a debug key.

  4. I moved the error-tracking token into a secret manager and replaced stored cloud credentials in the iOS pipeline with keyless federation.

  5. I fixed a callback that used a stored credential, so callbacks now use the build's own identity token.

Key decision

I chose to make builds fail loudly instead of continuing in a weaker mode, for example a missing release signature.

The cost is that some builds now stop that used to pass. I accepted that, since a passing build with a debug key is worse.

Result

There are 0 open paths to production app-store publishing without authentication.

What I learned

I would run this kind of security review earlier, before a pipeline has been in use for long. Several of these gaps were easy to close once someone looked.

Stack

  • Cloud Functions
  • IAM
  • Secret Manager
  • Workload Identity Federation
  • Node.js
  • Google Play
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